For another, skeptics typically grant that one has some knowledge. Since he is describing awareness phenomenologically, from the inside, he must account for how the perceiver himself understands his mental states. Without a doubt this would be an excellent textbook for upper-level undergraduate courses or a good book to include in the readings for introductory graduate courses in epistemology. The author develops a theory of awareness in which perception gives us an awareness of objects, not mental representations, and we have non-inferential knowledge of the objects' properties. Book is in Used-Good condition. But no normal perceiver would argue that the stick is bent, despite the fact that it appears to be so.
This short book is evidence of that. He is not, however, chopping the axe, but is chopping the wood by using the axe — the wood is the object of the chopping and the axe is the vehicle, or means, of the chopping. Philosophical skeptics claim that we know no such thing. Num Pages: 232 pages, bibliography, index. His position is that we have knowledge via perception, which is not the same as saying that all perceptual experiences constitute knowledge. But this line of criticism is not convincing.
Qualia exist over and above representational contents, and are ineffable in that they cannot be explained to someone who has never had a comparable experience. This is because forcefulness is a feature of how the object of perception is represented to the perceiver, namely as being present. From United Kingdom to U. Hallucination and correctness by coincidence are problems that he needs to address more thoroughly. The closer we come to the middle of the spectrum, however, the more difficult it is to distinguish — compare seeing a stick in water that appears bent and seeing a stick in water that appears slightly more bent than the optical phenomenon accounts for. These components are notably similar to those of awareness. In the fourth and fifth chapters he articulates his own position, in the sixth he defends it against objections, in the seventh he offers his critique of indirect realism and in the eighth he urges the merits of direct realism as an answer to skepticism.
Representationalists claim that we can gain such knowledge only by inference, by showing that the hypothesis of a real world is the best explanation for the kind of sensations and mental images we experience. Hence, this appearance must be an integral part of perceptual experience and independent from interpretation. Pages and cover are clean and intact. Huemer rebuts the main arguments used by philosophical skeptics to try to show that we cannot know anything about the world outside of the mind, as well as the arguments used by representationalists to try to show that we only perceive representations of external objects. It is the purpose of representational content to give us information about the world; if the two functions are integrated, it makes more sense to simply assign them to representational content and discard qualia as redundant. Further, Huemer confronts the four main arguments for philosophical skepticism, showing that they are powerless against this kind of theory of perceptual knowledge. His theory of perception—on which his version of direct realism In Skepticism and the Veil of Perception Michael Huemer aims to undermine skepticism about direct realism and to articulate his own version of direct realism.
Mike Huemer now proceeds to set out four arguments for skepticism, the first of which is as follows: 1. In order to have awareness of objects, one must undergo a non-perceptual process of judgment, forming a theory that infers the existence of objects from the sense data. He rejects brain states for the same reason; normal perceivers do not have the perceptual experience of synapses firing. Some can be defended against, while others can be reconciled to his account with only minor revisions. There is no way that content could be represented to the perceiver except by his experiencing it, nor is there anything outside of his experience that he is aware of when he perceives something.
Objection 2: Where to Draw the Lines Huemer is satisfied with some ambiguities that should make the reader wary. The argumentation is generally tight, plentiful, and employed to good purpose, a model of what philosophical work in this genre should be. Expressed instead, and much more happily, in terms of the degrees-of-assent model of belief, the idea is that knowledge may rest upon beliefs whose epistemic probability is less than one half, and that are assented to at the appropriate, less-than-one-half level. This sort of example highlights two problems with accidental correspondence: the apprehension is not of the true object, and the observer does not have sufficient reasons to believe that it is. If we are aware of objects in virtue of having perceptual experiences, it does not follow that we are aware of those experiences as objects of awareness themselves; that awareness would be second-order, a representation of a representation. Someone who was born deaf, for example, cannot understand what it is like to hear. That means that the fact that a belief has been accepted by everyone up until a certain time does not suffice to make it a common sense belief, and to know or be justified in believing that something is a common sense belief one must know or be justified in believing that it will be accepted by almost everyone at every time in the future.
This implies that they share a common mental state and that internal experiences should be recognized as separate from external objects of perception. Huemer rebuts the main arguments used by philosophical skeptics to try to show that we cannot know anything about the world outside of the mind, as well as the arguments used by representationalists to try to show that we only perceive representations of external objects. Even having accepted their ineffability as a characteristic of experience, the existence of qualia still seems superfluous. Since Descartes, one of the central questions of Western philosophy has been that of how we know that the objects we seem to perceive are real. That is, because our perceptual experiences are direct, the knowledge we gain from them is also direct. For instance, one might see a coil of rope and mistake it for a snake.
We perceive external objects by having perceptual experiences, not by perceiving perceptual experiences. Without forcefulness, the experience is no longer a perceptual one: it is an imagination or a memory. Huemer could argue that one is inclined to judge that an experience is hallucinatory when it does not accord with his expectations of reality, correcting for errors in perception after the fact, but this raises two problems. How are 2 and 3 to be established? The two can have the same content — if one imagines a duck or sees one, the content is a duck in both cases. Representational content represents an object as being a certain way to the perceiver.